Relative profit maximization and irrelevance of leadership in Stackelberg model by Tanaka, Yasuhito
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Relative profit maximization and
irrelevance of leadership in Stackelberg
model
Yasuhito Tanaka
11. May 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55887/
MPRA Paper No. 55887, posted 13. May 2014 09:21 UTC
Relative prot maximization and irrelevance of
leadership in Stackelberg model
Yasuhito Tanaka
Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University,
Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto, 602-8580, Japan
E-mail: yasuhito@mail.doshisha.ac.jp
Abstract
We study the Stackelberg equilibrium in a symmetric duopoly with
dierentiated goods in which each rm maximizes its relative prot
that is the dierence between its prot and the prot of the rival rm.
We show that the equilibrium output and price of the good of the
leader and those of the follower are equal, that is, the role of leader or
follower is irrelevant to the equilibrium, and the equilibrium outputs
and prices do not change between the case where the rms are quantity
setting rms and the case where the rms are price setting rms. We
assume that demand functions are linear and symmetric, the marginal
costs of the rms are common and constant, and the xed costs are
zero.
Keywords: dierentiated duopoly, relative prot maximization, Stackel-
berg model, irrelevance of leadership.
JEL code: D43, L13.
Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University, Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto, 602-8580, Japan.
E-mail: yasuhito@mail.doshisha.ac.jp
1
1 Introduction
We study the Stackelberg equilibrium in a symmetric duopoly with dier-
entiated goods in which each rm maximizes its relative prot that is the
dierence between its prot and the prot of the rival rm. We show that
the equilibrium output and price of the good of the leader and those of the
follower are equal, that is, the role of leader or follower is irrelevant to the
equilibrium, and the equilibrium outputs and prices do not change between
the case where the rms are quantity setting rms and the case where the
rms are price setting rms. We assume that demand functions are linear
and symmetric, the marginal costs of the rms are common and constant,
and the xed costs are zero.
In recent years, maximizing relative prot instead of absolute prot has
aroused the interest of economists. From an evolutionary perspective, Schaf-
fer (1989) demonstrates with a Darwinian model of economic natural selec-
tion that if rms have market power, prot-maximizers are not necessarily
the best survivors. According to Schaer (1989), a unilateral deviation from
Cournot equilibrium decreases the prot of the deviator, but decreases the
other rms prot even more. On the condition of being better than other
competitors, rms that deviate from Cournot equilibrium achieve higher
payos than the payos they receive under Cournot equilibrium. In Vega-
Redondo (1997), it is argued that, under a general equilibrium framework,
if rms maximize relative prot, a Walrasian equilibrium can be induced.
On the other hand, Lundgren (1996) shows that by making managerial
compensation depend on relative prots rather than absolute prots, the
incentives for oligopoly collusion can be eliminated. Kockesen et. al.(2000)
have shown that under some conditions a rm which strives to maximize
relative prot will outperform a rm which maximizes absolute prot. Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) conducted an analysis considering an individual utility
function that brings about a feeling of compassion toward an individual with
a relatively lower material payo and simultaneously brings about envy of
other individuals with a higher material payo.
As demonstrated by Matsumura and Matsushima (2009) evaluations of
managers' performances are often based on their relative performance. Out-
performing managers often obtain good positions in the management job
markets. And the spiteful behavior as well as reciprocal behavior or altru-
istic behavior is closely related to the objective functions based on relative
performance. The use of relative performance evaluation has been empiri-
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cally supported by Gibbons and Murphy (1990)1.
In another unpublished paper Tanaka (2013a) we have shown that in a
duopoly with dierentiated goods under linear demand functions when rms
maximize relative prots, a Cournot equilibrium and a Bertrand equilibrium
coincide. In Tanaka (2013b) we studied the choice of strategic variables
by rms in a two stage game of duopoly with linear demand functions such
that in the rst stage the rms choose their strategic variables and in the
second stage they determine the values of their strategic variables, and we
have shown that when the rms maximize their relative prots, the choice of
strategic variables is irrelevant to the outcome of the game in the sense that
the equilibrium outputs, prices and prots of the rms are the same in all
situations, and so any combination of strategy choice by the rms constitutes
a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the two stage game.
The result of this paper is an extension of theses results.
2 The model
There are two rms, A and B. They produce dierentiated substitutable
goods. Denote the output of Firm A and B, respectively, by xA and xB,
the prices of the goods of Firm A and B, respectively, by pA and pB. The
marginal costs of the rms are common, and equal c > 0. There is no xed
cost.
The inverse demand functions of the goods produced by the rms are
pA = a  xA   bxB; (1)
and
pB = a  xB   bxA; (2)
where a > c and 0 < b < 1. xA represents the demand for the good of Firm
A, and xB represents the demand for the good of Firm B. The prices of the
goods are determined so that demand of consumers for each rm's good and
supply of each rm are equilibrated.
The ordinary demand functions for the goods of the rms are obtained
from these inverse demand functions as follows,
xA =
1
1  b2 [(1  b)a  pA + bpB]; (3)
1For these arguments about relative prot maximization we refer to Lu (2011).
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and
xB =
1
1  b2 [(1  b)a  pB + bpA]: (4)
We consider a model of Stackelberg competition. Firm A is a leader and
Firm B is a follower. We analyze two cases. One is a case where the rms,
the leader and the follower, are quantity setting (Cournot type) rms. And
in the other case the rms are price setting (Bertrand type) rms.
3 Summary of absolute prot maximization
case
In this subsection for reference we summary the results of the case of absolute
prot maximization.
First assume that Firm A and B are quantity setting rms. Firm B
determines its output given the output of Firm A. Then, we get the reaction
function of Firm B as follows.
xB =
1
2
(a  bxA   c): (5)
The leader, Firm A, determines its output given the reaction function of
Firm B in (5). The equilibrium outputs of Firm A and B are, respectively,
xQA =
(2  b)(a  c)
2(2  b2) ;
and
xQB =
(4  b2   2b)(a  c)
4(2  b2) :
The equilibrium prices of the goods of Firm A and B are, respectively
pQA =
(4 + b3   2b2   2b)a+ (4  b3   2b2 + 2b)c
4(2  b2) ;
and
pQB =
(4  b2   2b)a+ (4  3b2 + 2b)c
4(2  b2)) :
Comparing xQA with x
Q
B,
xQA   xQB =
b2(a  c)
4(2  b2) > 0:
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Thus, the equilibrium output of the leader is larger than that of the follower.
Next, assume that Firm A and B are price setting rms, Firm B deter-
mines the price of its good given the price of the good of Firm A. Then, we
get the reaction function of Firm B as follows,
pB =
1
2
[(1  b)a+ bpA + c]: (6)
The leader, Firm A, determines the price of its good given the reaction
function of Firm B in (6). The equilibrium prices of the goods of Firm A
and B are, respectively,
pPA =
(1  b)(2 + b)a+ (2 + b  b2)c
2(2  b2) ;
and
pPB =
(1  b)(4  b2 + 2b)a+ (4  b2 + 2b  b3)c
4(2  b2) :
The equilibrium outputs of Firm A and B are, respectively
xPA =
(2 + b)(a  c)
4(1 + b))
;
and
xPB =
(4  b2 + 2b)(a  c)
4(1 + b)(2  b2) :
Comparing xPA with x
P
B,
xPA   xPB =
 b2(a  c)
4(2  b2) < 0:
Thus, the equilibrium output of the leader is smaller than that of the follower.
4 Relative prot maximization
In this section we consider a case of relative prot maximization. The relative
prot of Firm A (or B) is the dierence between its prot and the prot of
Firm B (or A). Denote the relative prot of Firm A by A and that of Firm
B by B.
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4.1 Quantity setting competition
Assume that the rms, Firm A and B, are quantity setting rms. The relative
prot of Firm B is written as, using the inverse demand function,
B = (a  xB   bxA)xB   cxB   (a  xA   bxB)xA + cxA: (7)
Firm B determines its output given the output of Firm A so as to maximize
B. The condition for relative prot maximization of Firm B is
a  2xB   bxA   c+ bxA = 0: (8)
Then, the output of Firm B is obtained as follows,
~xB =
a  c
2
: (9)
This is the reaction function of Firm B, but it does not depend on xA, and
it is the equilibrium output of Firm B. The leader, Firm A, determines its
output given the reaction function of Firm B in (9) so as to maximize its
relative prot. The relative prot of Firm A is
A =

a  xA   b
2
(a  c)

xA   cxA  

a  1
2
(a  c)  bxA

 1
2
(a  c)
(10)
+ c 1
2
(a  c):
The condition for relative prot maximization of Firm A is
a  2xA   b
2
(a  c)  c+ b
2
(a  c) = 0: (11)
The equilibrium output of Firm A is obtained as follows,
~xA =
a  c
2
:
The equilibrium prices of the goods of Firm A and B are, respectively
~pA =
(1  b)a+ (1 + b)c
2
;
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and
~pB =
(1  b)a+ (1 + b)c
2
:
We nd ~xA = ~xB and ~pA = ~pB. Therefore, whether a rm is the leader
or the follower does not aect the equilibrium outputs and prices at the
Stackelberg equilibrium under relative prot maximization when the rms
are quantity setting rms.
4.2 Price setting competition
Assume that the rms, Firm A and B, are price setting rms. The relative
prot of Firm B is written as, using the ordinary demand function,
B =
1
1  b2 [(1 b)a pB+bpA](pB c) 
1
1  b2 [(1 b)a pA+bpB](pA c):
(12)
Firm B determines the price of its good given the price of the good of Firm
A so as to maximize B. The condition for relative prot maximization of
Firm B is
(1  b)a  2pB + bpA + c  b(pA   c) = 0: (13)
The price of the good of Firm B is written as follows,
p^B =
(1  b)a+ (1 + b)c
2
: (14)
This is the reaction function of Firm B in this case, but it does not depend
on pA, and it is the equilibrium price of the good of Firm B. The leader, Firm
A, determines the price of its good given the reaction function of Firm B in
(14). The relative prot of Firm A is
A =
1
1  b2

(1  b)a  pA + b(1  b)a+ (1 + b)c
2

(pA   c) (15)
  1
1  b2

(1  b)a  (1  b)a+ (1 + b)c
2
+ bpA

(1  b)a+ (1 + b)c
2
  c

:
The condition for relative prot maximization of Firm A is
(1 b)a 2pA+b(1  b)a+ (1 + b)c
2
+c b(1  b)a+ (1 + b)c
2
+bc = 0: (16)
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The equilibrium price of the good of Firm A is obtained as follows,
p^A =
(1  b)a+ (1 + b)c
2
:
The equilibrium outputs of Firm A and B are, respectively
x^A =
a  c
2
;
and
x^B =
a  c
2
:
We nd x^A = x^B and p^A = p^B. Therefore, whether a rm is the leader
or the follower does not aect the equilibrium outputs and prices at the
Stackelberg equilibrium under relative prot maximization when the rms
are quantity setting rms.
Further we nd ~xA = x^A, ~xB = x^B, ~pA = p^A and ~pB = p^B. Thus, the
Stackelberg equilibrium when the rms are quantity setting rms and that
when the rms are price setting rms coincide.
5 Concluding Remarks
From the results of the previous sections we get the following conclusion.
At the Stackelberg equilibrium in a duopoly with dierentiated
goods in which each rm maximizes its relative prot that is the
dierence between its prot and the prot of the rival rm, the
output and price of the good of the leader and those of the follower
are equal, that is, the role of leader or follower is irrelevant to the
equilibrium, and the equilibrium outputs and prices do not change
between the case where the rms are quantity setting rms and
the case where the rms are price setting rms. We assumed that
demand functions are linear and symmetric, the marginal costs of
the rms are common and constant, and the xed costs are zero.
Relative prot maximization is another model of imperfect competition
in addition to Cournot and Bertrand models. Under relative prot maxi-
mization distinction of Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg is meaningless.
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In monopoly and perfect competitive economy relative prot maximization
coincides with absolute prot maximization.
Assuming that rms seek to maximize some weighted average of absolute
and relative prots may be more realistic. In this paper, however, we have
presented striking results under the assumption of genuine relative prot
maximization.
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